Geopolitical instability increases the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation

The world is going through a turbulent phase of geopolitical change that is fueling the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. Several factors are contributing to this dynamic. Iran has taken a clear leap forward in a nuclear program in which, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there is evidence of secret and unexplained activities that have aroused the suspicion of regional adversaries and Western powers. Meanwhile, Trump’s rise to power has shaken the confidence of U.S. allies that Washington’s nuclear umbrella will protect them, and they are therefore more or less explicitly considering alternatives. China is moving forward in expanding its arsenal to approach the magnitude of those of the U.S. and Russia, which in turn are embarking on extraordinary nuclear weapons modernization programs instead of moving toward the disarmament mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Meanwhile, the security treaty architecture is collapsing.

Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, expressed his concern about this general dynamic last Wednesday during a meeting with a group of international journalists invited to the agency’s headquarters in Vienna to gain a deeper understanding of the nuclear landscape. Asked by this newspaper whether this geopolitical context is increasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, he responded emphatically: “Yes.”

“There are countries that even respected the NPT despite having all the technologies and capabilities [to acquire atomic weapons]. Now they are beginning to have an open conversation that asks whether, in this changing world, in which certain guarantees of the past are no longer as firm, they should reconsider. What’s new is that countries that firmly upheld the NPT are now asking questions. I think that’s where the risks lie. I think this is a moment fraught with enormous consequences, in which the principle of nonproliferation must be upheld more firmly than ever,” Grossi said, emphasizing a novel aspect of the proliferation challenge.

In South Korea, for example, polls indicate that up to 70% of the population supports the development of its own nuclear weapons. Poland’s leaders are considering options, not for the manufacture of weapons, but for new and more reliable nuclear safeguards. “Poland must pursue the most advanced capabilities, including nuclear and modern unconventional weapons. This is a serious race — a race for security, not for war,” Prime Minister Donald Tusk said in March.

The distrust of U.S. allies regarding their protection is a new factor that adds to old, worsening problems.

The IAEA has been documenting for years an acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program, which, along with evidence of secret activity, is raising concerns. Tehran already enriches uranium to a level of 60%, far above that needed for nuclear power plants, and already close to the threshold of over 90% needed for bombs.

The IAEA plans to publish two reports on Iran, which some news agencies have seen. One notes the new jump in enriched uranium production, with a cumulative total of about 400 kilograms enriched to 60%, compared to about 275 kilograms in February. About 40 kilograms, once enriched to over 90%, are enough to build a bomb.

In the second — a special report requested by the IAEA Board of Governors — the agency notes the existence of evidence of nuclear activity at three previously undeclared sites in Iran, the circumstances of which remain unclear.

“We are still in the process of trying to clarify a number of issues about which Iran has not provided us with adequate answers,” Grossi told the international group of journalists. “In recent years, the agency has managed to discover traces of uranium in locations that, in principle, did not host any atomic activity in the past. To date, we have not received that clarification,” he added.

Diplomatic sources cited by Reuters suggest that, on this basis, Western powers will push for the passage of a resolution declaring that Tehran is violating its nuclear non-proliferation obligations for the first time in more than 20 years.

This development would, of course, represent a serious obstacle to negotiations between the U.S. and Iran to conclude a new nuclear deal. Grossi, who is not involved in the bilateral negotiations but is in contact with Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, and also with the Iranians, expressed some optimism, noting a willingness to engage in dialogue.

Trump’s willingness to pursue arms deals is a source of hope in this context. In an interview with this newspaper in early May, Fiona Hill, Trump’s national security adviser during his first term — and a strong critic of the Republican — highlighted the president’s inclination to pursue such agreements.

“Trump is very interested in negotiating arms control treaties, whether with Russia, perhaps later with China, or with Iran and North Korea. That was one of his top priorities in his first term. He’s concerned about the expiration of New START (the nuclear arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia, which expires next February),” Hill said.

Some speculate that this inclination has narcissistic undertones, specifically a desire to win a Nobel Peace Prize, which Barack Obama achieved through this means. But whatever the motivation, the reality is that both geopolitical movements and Trump’s own political volatility cast a serious shadow over hopes that the negotiating push will actually be effective.

Israel is seriously considering launching an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. Last Saturday, Benjamin Netanyahu again called on the international community to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Sources cited by Reuters indicate that the Saudi defense minister recently warned Iranians in Tehran that it is in their best interest to reach an agreement with Trump, otherwise an Israeli attack will follow. Within the Iranian regime, there is a standoff between those who believe the opportunity for dialogue should be seized and those who believe the extreme weakness evidenced by Israel’s military superiority requires nuclear insurance. Riyadh, for its part, announced its willingness to enrich uranium, something that falls within the civilian dimension of a nuclear program, but which has a potentially ambivalent meaning.

This context becomes even more complicated when looking at China’s military developments. The Pentagon has been indicating for years that Beijing is expanding its nuclear arsenal. The Chinese regime’s opacity makes it extremely difficult to determine the reality, but the general dynamics of China’s military buildup and the opinions of respected experts agree that this increase is very credible. China undoubtedly wants to bring the size of its arsenal closer to that of the United States and Russia, which are larger due to their enormous development during the Cold War.

This development is accompanied by major advances in hypersonic technology, which represents revolutionary changes in the field of bomb delivery, alters previous balances in missile defense, and contributes to instability.

In the background, there is a long list of treaties that the U.S. and Russia had been building during the Cold War to prevent the arms race from degenerating, but which have collapsed in recent years. Some concern conventional forces, but others have nuclear value. The outlook does not seem conducive to rebuilding them, among other reasons because Washington now wants China to also make commitments, and Beijing seems very unwilling to do so.

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