He Lifeng, the trusted aide to Xi Jinping who broke the trade deadlock

Speaking several languages is an important skill, we are often told by teachers, parents and human resources managers. But perhaps not so much for He Lifeng, the second vice-premier and chief economic negotiator of the Chinese government, who has just reached a deal with the United States on a 90-day tariff respite despite having — according to the media — a rather limited command of English.

The gathering in Geneva on May 10 and 11 was much more than a bilateral meeting. China and the U.S. walked in with accumulated tensions and a long history of mistrust. There, without the presence of cameras and with the earnest tone typical of such events, He met with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to try to stop the latest tariff escalation. They succeeded. The agreement, although temporary, implies a substantial reduction in tariffs: from 125% to 10% in the case of China, and from 145% to 30% in the case of the United States. It is a 90-day truce, at least on paper.

In a joint release, both governments spoke of “sincere talks” and the importance of maintaining communication channels open. The creation of a permanent mechanism to manage trade disputes was also announced. It was nothing particularly new, but it was significant given the backdrop.

Less visible, more bureaucratic

He is not a new face, even if his name has only begun to gain international visibility in recent years. Since 2023, he has headed the Office of the Communist Party’s Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs, the nerve center where key decisions on the country’s economic course are made. Before him, that position was held by Liu He, a Harvard graduate recognized for his ability for dialogue with the West. With Liu’s departure, He has taken over the role of economic czar of the Chinese government. Not with the same style, but with the same level of influence.

He represents another type of leadership: less visible, more bureaucratic, deeply aligned with the vision of President Xi Jinping. Their relationship dates back to the 1980s, when they both worked in Fujian province. Xi was then vice mayor of Xiamen; He was a young civil servant who had just graduated. Since then, his career has run parallel to that of the president, with steady promotions linked to the Party’s economic apparatus.

He was born in a rural county in Fujian to an ethnic Hakka family. Like so many of his generation, he experienced re-education in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. He then entered Xiamen University in 1979 and studied finance. He completed his education with a PhD in economics, and officially joined the Communist Party in 1981.

After years served in local and provincial administration, including stints in Xiamen, Fuzhou and the port city of Tianjin — where he earned the nickname He the Demolisher for his ambitious urban renewal projects —his career took a leap to the national level in 2014, when he was appointed deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission. In 2017 he went on to lead it, assuming responsibility for charting the country’s macroeconomic policies. From there he drove strategic plans such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and consolidated a model based on state leadership over the market.

In 2023 he was appointed second deputy prime minister, in charge of economic policy. He also joined the Politburo, the Party’s main organ of power. In doing so, he became the main technical figure behind Xi’s economic strategy. He has accompanied the president for decades and maintains a relation of personal trust that is unusual in the upper echelons of Chinese power.

His style, however, has not convinced everyone outside the country. In his first international appearances, he was perceived as a stiff, very formal negotiator, surrounded by aides and with little communicative fluency. At an event with businessmen in 2024, some of those present described him as “too technical” and lacking charisma. One investor even compared him to an artificial intelligence that answers with programmed responses.”

But that image seems to be changing. In recent months, several diplomats and entrepreneurs who have met with him have noticed a different attitude: more self-confidence, a greater ability to reach agreements, less rigidity. A senior U.S. executive sums up the general impression: “He now knows how to talk to Western interlocutors.” Some media have begun to refer to him as Xi’s fixer.

Ideologically, He represents continuity. His vision is fully statist: he considers that the State should set the course of the economy, and does not believe that opening up to the foreign markets should happen to the detriment of political control. In this he clearly differs from figures like Liu He, who was more of a reformist and better appreciated in global financial circles. He embodies the profile that the president prefers: disciplined, loyal and without ambitions of his own beyond executing the Party’s strategy.

He has neither the brilliance of a reformer nor the charisma of a born diplomat. But he doesn’t need to. His role is not to charm the markets, but to execute Xi’s economic roadmap with precision. In a system where loyalty outweighs creativity, he embodies the kind of power that is not displayed but imposed. He represents a China that does not seek to adapt to the world, but to teach it the rules of its own game.

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